University of Dayton

eCommons
Religious Studies Faculty Publications

Department of Religious Studies

2003

Virtues and Practices in the Christian Tradition:
Christian Ethics after MacIntyre
Nancey C. Murphy
Fuller Theological Seminary

Brad Kallenberg
University of Dayton, bkallenberg1@udayton.edu

Mark Thiessen Nation
Fuller Theological Seminary

Follow this and additional works at: http://ecommons.udayton.edu/rel_fac_pub
Part of the Comparative Methodologies and Theories Commons, Other Religion Commons, and
the Practical Theology Commons
eCommons Citation
Murphy, Nancey C.; Kallenberg, Brad; and Nation, Mark Thiessen, "Virtues and Practices in the Christian Tradition: Christian Ethics
after MacIntyre" (2003). Religious Studies Faculty Publications. Paper 65.
http://ecommons.udayton.edu/rel_fac_pub/65

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Religious Studies at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Religious Studies Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact frice1@udayton.edu,
mschlangen1@udayton.edu.

Nancey Murphy
Brad J. Kallenberg &
Mark Thiessen Nation

Chapter 1

The Master Argument of
Macintyre's After Virtue
Brad }. Kallenberg

What's All This Noise?
In September of 1995 the Associated Press released a wirephoto showing Russian lawmakers of both genders in a punching brawl during a session of the
Duma, Russia's lower house of parliament.1 Is this behavior an ethnic idiosyncrasy? Do only government officials duke it out over matters of great
importance? Or have fisticuffs suddenly become politically correct? No, on all
counts.
Pick a topic, any topic- abortion, euthanasia, welfare reform, military intervention in the Balkans- and initiate discussion with a group of reasonable,
well-e?ucated people and observe the outcome. Chaos ensues. Of course the
volume of the debate may vary according to how "close to home" the issue hits
the participants. But any moral discussion, given a group of sufficient diversity,
has the potential of escalating into a shouting match ... or worse.
An even more striking feature of moral debates is their tendency never rrrft{
reach resolution. Lines are drawn early, and participants rush to take sides. But
in taking sides they appear to render themselves incapable of hearing the other.
Everyone feels the heat, but no one sees the light. •
Many thinkers are inclined to see shrillness and interminability as part and
parcel of the nature of moral debate . But Alasdair Macintyre begs to differ.
In After Virtue he offers the "disquieting suggestion" that the tenor of modern
moral debate is the direct outcome of a catastrophe in our past, a catastrophe
so great that moral inquiry was very nearly obliterated from our culture and its
vocabulary exorcised from our language. What we possess today, he argues, are
nothing more than fragments of an older tradition. As a result, our moral discourse, which uses terms like good, and justice, and duty, has been robbed of
the context that makes it intelligible. To complicate matters, although university
courses in ethics have been around for a long time, no ethics curriculum predates
1. Sergei Shargorodsky, "Russian Lawmakers Do Battle," The Sun (San Bernardino, Calif.),
12 September 1995, A5.
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this catastrophe. Therefore, for anyone who has taken ethics courses, and especially for those who have studied ethics diligently, the disarray of modern moral
discourse is not only invisible, it is considered normal. This conclusion has been
lent apparent credibility by a theory called emotivism.
Emotivism, explains Macintyre, "is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments
and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling .... "2 On this account, the person who
remarks "Kindness is good" is not making a truth claim but simply expressing
a positive feeling, "Hurrah for kindness!" Similarly, the person who exclaims
"Murder is wrong" can be understood to be actually saying "I disapprove of
murder" or "Murder, yuck!"
If emotivism is a true picture of the way moral discourse works, then we
easily see that moral disputes can never be rationally settled because, as the emotivist contends, all value judgments are nonrational. Reason can never compel a
solution; we simply have to hunker down and decide . Moral discussion is at best
rhetorical persuasion.
There are sound reasons for questioning the emotivist picture. In the first
place, emotivism is self-defeating insofar as it makes a truth claim about the
non-truth-claim status of all purported truth claims! To put it differently, if all
truth claims in the sphere of ethics are simply expressions of preference, as emotivism maintains, then the theory of emotivism itself lacks truth value, and thus
we are not constrained to believe it if we prefer not to. In addition, emotivism
muddies some ordinarily clear waters. Any proficient language speaker will attest
to the fact that the sense of "I prefer . . . " is vastly different from the sense of
"You ought .. . " The distinct uses to which we put these phrases is enabled precisely because the sense of "You ought" cannot be reduced without remainder
to "I prefer."
But Macintyre is not content to offer first-order arguments against emotivism. Stopping there would have made his book simply another ethical
theory -just the sort of thing that emotivism so convincingly dismisses . Instead, what Macintyre is up to has been called _weta-ethig- an exploration into
the conditions (or conditioners) of human ethical thought. As a human enterprise, ethics must be shaped in the same way that language, culture, and history
shape the rest of our thinking. By investigating the historical conditionedness of
our moral life and discourse, Macintyre undermines emotivism, making a strong
case for its own historical conditionedness. Emotivism as a moral philosophy appears to explain why contemporary moral debates are irresolvable. But it cannot
accou nt for the oddity that rival positions within these debates all employ incommensurable concepts. Why cannot the Kantian ("The taking of human life
is always and everywhere just plain wrong") concede even a modicum of legitimacy to the Lockean argument ("Abortion is the natural right of women") if
2. Alasdair Macintyre, After Vil·tue, 2d eel. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1984), 11-12. Hereafter, page numbers in parentheses in the text refer to this book.
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both views boil down to "I don't/do approve of abortion"? Nor can emotivism
explain the oddity that interminable moral debates are conducted with the expectation that such debates can be resolved and, in keeping with this optimism,
are conducted in such a way that rival positions appeal to principles presumed to
be ultimate. In other words, if all value judgments are expressive, how did this
belief in ultimate principles arise? Macintyre suggests that it makes more sense
to look for a source of this optimism, and its belief in ultimates, in a tradition
that predates emotivism. •
In fact, if one looks closely at the modern moral self, it has the appearance
of being dislocated, as if it were missing something. The moral self as conceived
by the emotivist is "totally detached from all social particularity" and is, rather,
"~ntirely set over against the social world" (32). This autonomous self has no
giVen continuities, possesses no ultimate governing principles, and is guided by
no telos. Instead it is aimless, having "a certain abstract and ghostly character"
(33). If Macintyre is correct in asserting that "the emotivist self, in acquiring
sovereignty in its own realm lost its traditional boundaries provided by a social
identity and a view of human life as ordered to a given end," then it comes as
no surprise that such a self flounders helplessly and endlessly in moral quagmires
~34). But how did this catastrophe come to pass, and what exactly are the social
1dentity and tefos that were lost?

The Failure of the Enlightenment Project
The catastrophe that left the modern moral world in such disarray was a series of failed attempts to provide rational justification of morality for a culture
~hat had philosophy as its central social activit)!:. This eighteenth-century culture
was called the Enlightenment, and its misguided agenda Macintyre dubs the
Enlightenment Project.
Among the first attempts to justify morality were those of J?enis Diderot
(1713-84) and D,Jyid Hume (1711-76). Diderot tried to make human des1re the
criterion of an action's right~ess or wrongrte'Ss but failed to answerifow a touflitt
of desires, and hence a conflict between an action's rightness and wrongness,
could be resolved. Like Diderot, Hume conceived human passion as the stuff of
morality because it is passion, not reason, that ultimately moves the moral agent
to act. Hume oes further than Diderot b s ecif in a ruling passion (he calls
-i "sympailiij, but he can prov1 e sufficient explanation neit er or why this
passion ought to predominate nor for why his account of the moral life looks
suspiciously like that of the English bourgeoisie he emulated. 3
Provoked by the failures of Hume and Diderot to ground morality in human
passion, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) strove to round moralit in reason al ne.
He argued that if morality was rationa , its form would be identical for all ra3. Alasdair Macintyre, Whose justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1988), 300-325.
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tional beings. Therefore, the moral thing to do is to follow those principles that
can be universalized, that is, to follow those principles that one could consistently wish for everyone to follow. This sounds suspiciously like the Golden
Rule. What makes it different, however, is Kant's conviction t~le
~niversalizability (also called the categ01·ical imperative) gets its punch from
the requirement that it be willed without falling into rational contradiction. 4
Unfortunately, Kant's system has several large flaws, not the least of which is its
ability to "justify" immoral maxims such as "Persecute all those who hold false
religious beliefs" as well as trivial ones such as "Always cat mussels on Mondays
in March" (46).
S0ren Kierkegaard (1813-55) heartily agreed with the content of the morality
that Kant defended (middle-class German Lutheran piety), but he also perceived
that Kant's rational vindication of morality had failed as miserably as its predecessors . .1\_ccordin to Kie ·
all persons are free to choose the lane of
their existence. But this leaves open the problem of how to ecide which plane
t~ce the criteria for making the decision are internal to the plane
under consideration. Shall I inhabit the plane of the pleasure-seeking aesthete
or that of the ethical rule-follower? To choose according to passion is to be relegated to the plane of the aesthetic. To choose according to reason is to have
already chosen the ethical plane. Hence, neither passion nor reason can be the
criterion for making the choice. The choiCe is a criterionless leap. Macintyre
concludes:
Just as Hume seeks to found morality on the passions because his arguments have
excluded the possibility of founding it on reason, so Kant founds it on reason
because his arguments have excluded the possibility of founding it on the passions,
and Kierkegaard on criterionless fundamental choice because of what he takes to
be the compelling nature of the considerations which exclude both reason and the
passions. (49)
4. This can be understood by means of the following illustration. Consider first the case where
lying is simply speaking the opposite of the truth. A person. faced with the question of whether
to lie on a given occasion should easily realize that lying cannot be universalized without rational
contrad iction. For if everyone lied, then lying would become the normal mode of communication.
If everyone always lied, we would simply adjust our expectations and hence cou ld navigate just fine.
For example, one day my eight-year-old ;o n declined my offer of a peanut butter sandwich but
then reminded me with a grin that Tut!'sday was "opposite day." Once I knew the plan, we had no
trouble communicating because I could bank on the opposite of what he said. ("Do you like it?"
"No, it's awful. I hate it!") Similarly, in a world where lying was the universal practice, deception
cou ld not exist because lying, in effect, would have become the means of truth-telling. Of course,
this would fly in the face of what we understand by the term lying. So we run headlong •n to a
rational contradiction: lying cannot be universalized because when universalized, lying ceases to be
lying. Therefore, the opposite of lying must be universalizablc; or to put it differently, truth- tclhng
is the categorical imperative.
.
Now imagine the case that lying is not simple opposite-saying but distortion of truth - a m!Xture
of truth and error. It should be clear that the so rt of confusion that would be produced by universalizing this brand of lying would be on the scale that disables all communication- including_ deceptiou.
In such a world "intent to deceive" has no meaning. So, once again, we run up agamst a ratwnal contradiction: universalization of lying leads to the state of affairs in which what is ulllversalized, 1.e.,
lying, is logically impossible.
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So by Burne's standards Kant is unjustified in his conclusions; by Kant's standards Hume is both unjustified and unintelligible. By Kierkegaard's, both Hume
and Kant are intelligible, but neither is compelling. The proof of the Enlight~n~ent Project's failure is the stubborn existence of rival conceptions of moral
JUStification.

Why the Enlightenment Project Had to Fail
The important thing to realize is that the ~nlightenment Prqject didn't simply
happen to fail, it had to fail. What doome he Efllightenment Project from its
inceptwn was its loss of the concept o telos. The word telos is borrowed from
classical Greek and mean en or urpose.' When applied to human morality the term signifies the answer to the question "What is human life for?" In
Aristotle's day (fourth century B.c.), moral reasoning was an argument consisting
of three terms. The first term was the notion of the untutored human nature,
which so desperately needed moral guidance. The secOrid term was human nature conceived in terms of having fulfilled i?s-p{trpose or achieved its telos. Moral
imperatives, the third term, was t at set o mstruct1
or movin rom the un
t~ed self toward the actualized telos (see fig. 1). In this way moral precepts
weren't snatched out of thm air but got their "punch" or their "oughtness" from
the concrete notion of what human life was for. 5
The wristwatch is a good example of how this works . If we ask "what is
the wristwatch for?" the usual answer is that watches are for timekeeping.6 To
put it more technically, we could say that the purpose or tefos of the watch is
timekeeping. Or, to put it in still other terms, we can say that the watch is
functionally defined as a mechanism for keeping time. Knowledge of this telos enables us to render judgment against a grossly inaccurate watch as a "bad" watch.
Furthermore, our functional definition also allows us to identify the functional
imperative for watches: "Watches ought to keep time well."
Because the Enlightenment rejected the traditionally shared concept of what
human life is for and started, as it were, from scratch by inventing the idea
of humans as '.'autonomous individ u als,.;:~ the concept of tefos, so very central to
morality, was lost. Having rejected the received account of tefos, the only remaining option upon which moral principles might be grounded was the untutored
human nature - the very thing in need of guidance and, by nature, at odds with
those uidin princtples! (see fig. 2).
The results o the ailure of the Enlightenment Project were far-reaching.
First, without the notion of tefos serving as a means for moral triangulation,
5. Admitted ly, the Aristotelian model of morality makes moral imperatives appear hypotheti cal - as means to socially co nceded ends - but thei stic morality has the same basic shape. The
prim ary difference is that the theistic version contends that the human te/os is divinely determined,
a determination that has the effect of bestowing a categorical status on moral imperatives.
6. Of course, it could also be argued that watches make fashion statements, have sentimental
value, and so forth. But for sake of the illustration, let us imagine that watches arc useful only for
ti mckeepi ng.

-1... .
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moral value judgments lost their factual character. And, of course,~ues are
eal to facts can ever settle diSa"reements over v ues. It is
111 this state of a am that emotivism, with its claim that moral values were nothing but matters of preference, flourishes as a theory. Second, impostors stepped
in to fill the vacuum created by the absence of telos in moral reasoning. For example, utilitarianism can be seen to offer a ghostl su · ute when it asserts that
morality o erates according to the nnc1 e of greatest ood or re test numbet.
ut t is princ1p e 1s vacuous ecause the utilitarians who assert it cannot adequately define what "good" means. 7 Similarly, Kant tried to rescue the (newly)
autonomous morit agenrfrom the loss of authority in his or her moral statements by attempting to provide "rational" justification for statements deprived of
their former teleological status. Not only did Kant fail but later analytic philosophy cannot advance Kantian ar uments without smu lin in undefined terms
such a; rights an ;ustice. Macintyre's point is that tradition alone provi es t e
sense of terms Ii~ an~ .iustice and telos. The presence of this moral vocabulary in debates today on y goes to show that "modern moral utterance and
practice can only be understood as a series of fragmented survivals from an older
past and that the insoluble problems which they have generated for modern
moral theories will remain insoluble until this is well understood" (110 - 11). In
the absence of traditions, moral debate is out of joint and becomes a theater of
illusions in which simple indignation and mere protest occupy center stage:

~no a

But protest is now almost entirely that negative phenomenon which characteristically occurs as a reaction to the alleged invasion of someone's rights in the name
of someone else's utility. The self-assertive shrillness of protest arises because the
facts of incom mensurabilit ensure that rotesters can never win an ar ument; the
indignant self-righteousness of protest arises because the acts o incommensurab ility ensure equally that the protesters can never lose an argument either. (71;
cf. 77)

7. Please note, however, that the situ ation in the wake of the E nlightenment Project's failure is
far worse th an merely a state of being unable to settle disagreeme nts. Macintyre argues that the disagreements themselves arc wrongheaded in the first place. Seventeenth-century empiricists thought
themselves adequate to the task of dealing with brute facts , when the truth of the matter is that
facts cannot be perceived apart from a conceptual framewo rk that recognizes, sorts, prioritizes, and
evaluates the facts . Value-laden theory is required to support observati on as much as vice-versa. This
insight was overlooked when, in the transition to the world of "modern" science, the med ieval notion
of final cause (i. e., causes that proceed according to te/oi) was rejected in favor of making effi cient
causes the whole ball of wa:x. When this scientistic view becomes adopted by ethi cists, what emerges
is a mechanistic account of hum an action framed in terms of "laws of human behavior" with all
reference to intentions, purpo cs, and reasons for action omitted. The "facts" of human behavior are
thus construed free from value co ncepts (such as "good"), and human action is thereafter presumed
to be predictable and manipulable like all other physical bodi es. This presumption is embodi ed in
the central character of the emotivi st era: the bureaucratic manager. U nfortunately for the manager
we do not possess lawlike generalizations for hum an behavior. In fact, human behavior is systematical ly unpredictable for a number of reasons. Both the expert manager and the attending virtue of
"effectiveness" arc fict ions which expose the poverty of the Enlightenment Project. Cf. After Virtue,

93-99.

Brad }. Kallenberg

14

Nietzsche or Aristotle?
Macintyre concludes that we are faced with a momentous choice. The present
emotivist world cannot be sustained much longer. Nietzsche saw this cle~rly.
He argued convincingly that every time a person made an apnral to "~
tivity," it was none other than a thinly disguised expression
the er~J.l,S
sutSj""ective will. When we look at post-Enlightenment ethics througli ietzsche s
eyes, weca;;see that insofar as the Enlightenment Project offers putative m~ral
principles (that is, ones that are devoid of the background context that g1ves
them their clout), it creates a moral vacuum which will inevitably be filled by
headstrong people asserting their individual will-to-power; and to the victor
go the spoils. To put it differently, the wativi~orld is neither stabk;~
self-sustaining. Rather, it is a battleground of competing wills a;;iting the
;m"ergence or a conqueror. Once the Aristotelian model of morality was rejected and the Enlightenment Project had failed, the danger of an imminent
Obermensch (who resembles Hitler more than Superman) must be conceded. -r:he
only stopper to this danger is the possibility of recognizing that the Ar~·
model ought not to have been rejected in the firs la . We are~ th~n,
with a momentous choice e ween Nietzsche and Aristotle. "There is no th 1rd
alternative" (118).

0

In Praise of Aristotle
In order for Macintyre to make a case that the Aristotelian morality ought never
to have been discarded, he must first demonstrate the strength of this moral
tradition from its origin in Homeric literature to its full-blown AristotelianThomistic form of the late Middle Ages.
H eroic Society

Storytelling was the primary tool for moral education in classical Greece- ~t
was for this reason that Homer's epic poems reflect the moral structure of their
times. Not only does art reflect life, but literature in particular is the reposit 0 ~Y
for moral stories, stories that have the peculiar ability of becoming embodied 1n
the life of the community that cherishes them. This fact, that human life pas
the same shape as that of a story, will come up again in our discussion.
The moral structure of heroic society has two other outstanding features.
First, morali
as a social dimension. The social mobility that typifies our age
was entirely absent in omer s time. hen, one was born into a social struct\Jre
that was fixed: "Every individual has a given role and status within the -welldefined and highly determinate system of roles and statuses" (122). One's social
place determined both the responsibility to render certain services to others (for
example, it was incumbent on the head of the clan to defend and protect the
clan) and the privileges one could expect from others in return. What one lacl~ed
in "upward mobility" was compensated by greater security. To know one's role
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and status in t ·
social s tern was to h
led forever the question
"'0'ho am I?" In fact, no one ever thought of asking such existent! questio_ns
in heroic society because who one was was indistinguishable from what one d1d.
Within this social framework the word virtue (arete) describes any quality that
is required for discharging one's role. As the clan's warrior-defender, the head of
the clan needed courage as well as physical strength and battle savvy. Courage
is also intimately linked to another virtue, fidelity. Fidelity and courage become
obligatory because the community can survive only if kinsmen can be relied
upon to fight valiantly on each other's behalf should the need arise.
This highlights a third feature of the moral structure of heroic societies. Since
morality is bound up with the social structure of the clan, questions about moral
value are questions offact. J£st..gs what EJI:I'ith£es <IS a "r.fght" moye in the game
of chess is
·
ed-u on ob·e t of the game, so, too, the
rr:_or~y ac~eptable ~ove" was~Iy identified for __E1~ _o par~igpat~n
die game. However, there was no way for a person in hero1c soc1ety to step
outs1d~ the ~or~ "~arne" to evaluate it, as is possible with chess. "All questions
of chmce anse Wlthm the framework the framework itself therefore cannot be
c~osen" precisely because the person' who does try to step outside his or her
g:ven social position "would be engaged in the enterprise of trying to make
h1mself [or herself] disappear" (126).

Athenian Society
Life in Athens illustrates an im rtant
he life of a moral traditi~growth comes throug~ In arge measure, morality was a su ~ec ~ at
r~celved a great deal of attention from the Athenians because of a perceived
d1screpancy be_tween their moral "scriptures" (the Homeric literature) and life
as they knew lt. _No Athenian could conceive of living like an Achilles or an
Agamemno~. ~hls ~oes _not illustrate that the heroic society had been mistaken
about moraht.Y s socxaf dimension, but rather, that the social structure since the
d_ays of Homer ~ad undergone such a drastic change (with the emergence of the
il I
_d hape too. The changes
clty-state, or polts) that morality had
in the social world had the fT1
f necessar y c lange s f
li .
f th
.
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ect
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broadening
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tween mundane virtues and "true" virtue. Plato is willing to grant that the virtues
are the means to a happy life, but getting clear about the nature of "true" happiness (and "true" virtue) requires shifting one's focu s from the earthly polis to
contemplate mstead the"""ideal" world. Plato was convinced that this exercise in
~emplation would show that true happiness is the satisfaction of having lived
in accordance with one's true nature. Human nature, according to Plato, was
composed of three parts. The highest part- that w.hich--p.articipates lT!Q.S1 fully
~ th~::..realm of the Ideal- is the intellect andrr; assisted in its funct'Fon by the
virtue of wisdom. The lowest part- that which is shared with the beasts- is
the desiring part and is to be constrained by the virtue of prudence. Between lay
a motivational well-spring, or high-spirited part, which is assisted by the virtue
of courage. A fourth virtue, justice, refers to the state of affairs when all three
are in proper order with respect to each other. This set of four virtues is called
cardinal (from the Latin cardo which means "door hinge") because they are the
~s upon which the truly happy life hangs. 8
It is important to remember that these two contemporaneous but varying
conceptions of the virtues were attempts to align the concept of virtue with the
purpose of life as understood in the newly broadened context- that of the polis.
This broadening was the first movement toward the belief in a universal moral
order, which finds clearer expression in Aristotle.
But Plato did not have the last word even in his own day. His package of
virtues, together with the moral order it depicted, was all too neat. The tragic
dramatists, such as ~the kinds of real conflicts that might
arise between virtues or betw~goods. To put it differently, the moral order
sometimes makes rival and incompatible claims on a person which can force him
or her into a tragic situation of having to make a choice between two or more
socially incumbent duties, each of which entails dire consequences. In grappling
with this conflict, the Sophoclean protagonist is forced to transcend his or her
society while remaining inescapably accountable to the higher moral order.
Here, then, is not simply an argument over which of two lists of virtues
is better (Achilles' courage or Oedipus's wisdom) but rather an argument over
which narrative form (Homer's epic poetry or a Sophoclean tragedy) best depicts
the form of human living. Macintyre suggests a general lesson to be learned: "to
adopt a stance on the virtues will be to adopt a stance on the narrative character
of human life" precisely because narrative and virtues are mutually supporting
and "internally connected" concepts (144).
8. Plato goes on to argue that society is, or ought to be, arranged along the same l.ines. The
bronze class of society arc those working fo lk whose citizenship is assisted by the virtue of prudence.
The silver class comprises the warriors in whom the high-spirited part of the soul don11nates . The
quality they need above all is courage. The gold class, of course, is made up of rl~c philosopherkings, whose role in society is not merely to rule but to con template truth with the a•d of the vutue
of wisdom. Social justice, in Plato's view, signified keeping the classes in the proper o~der, wh •ch
amounted to maintaining the status quo. In this way Plato's system is by nature conservative: change
(including progress) was bad; stability was good.
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Aristotle's Model
To defend Aristotle as the apex of virtue theory, Macintyre must make a chara~teristically un-Aristotelian move. He must show that Aristotle lies along the
htstorical trajectory that begins with Homeric literature and is, 0 -erefore, indebted to and dependent upon his predecessor~rthermore, Macintyre must
show that Aristotle's formulation of moral philosophy has advanced beyond his
pr~decessors while retaining characteristic features of the overall tradition. To do
thts Macintyre focuses on four features in Aristotle's thought.
. First, t~e concept of a moral orde.~;, which began to emer e in Plato's thinkJ.D.g.... becomes more explicit in Aristotle. However, unlike Plato's conception o
moral order, which ruled as it were from above, Aristotle sees this moral order as
internal to what it means to be human. Humans are teleological beings, which is
to say, J:uman living aims at an end, or telos. Some ends are intermediate rather
than terminal. The ship at which shipbuilding aims may in turn be means for the
practice of warcraft, which itself may be a means to a yet more distant end. Aristotle reasons that human action consists of means-end chains, which converge
on one ultimate end called the Good. The extent to which humans achieve their
tel~ is the extent to which they participate in the Good. In Aristotle's mind,
the telos can be conceived only in terms of a thing's natural function. Similarly,
virtues are function-specific, or more precisely, excellenc of function. 10 To illustrate, if the function of a horse is to run, then t e telos of a horse is racing, and
its virtue is its speed. Vir
fore are qualities that assist achievement of
_the telos, and the telos of a thing is bound up m e na ure o t e mg.
The nature of human beings, upon which the notion of the human telos
depends, is bound up in the metaphysical structure of the soul. According to
Aristotle, while we may share the vegetative (growth) and locomotive (movement) soul-stuff with the animals, humans are distinguished in the chain of
bein b their rational souls. The end of human life, therefore, is rationality,
and the virtues are 1 virtues of character which assist living according to reason
and (2) virtues ofthoiight which enable proper exercise of reason itself.
The notion of a function-specific telos represents an advance over earlier formulations of the tradition by providing a clearer account of moral imperatives.
As noted earlier in the wristwatch illustration, it is the concept of telos that
provides human beings with moral imperatives. If the function of a watch is
9. Frederick Copleston notes that Aristotle, like Hegel, saw him self to be systematizing and
improving upon previous philosophy. See /1 Hist01y of Philosophy, 9 vols. (New York: Doubleday,
1985), 1:371-78. Yet while Aristotle appreciated hi s platonic heritage, he co nceived his own work in
terms of "getting it right" in those places Plato "got it wrong." What is un-Aristotelian, therefore,
•s Macintyre's historicist claim tl1at Aristotle's work lies along a trajectory that stretches from Plato
to the Middle Ages and beyond; a claim that necessarily relativizes Aristotle's contribution to the
conceptual framework he shared with his predecessors. Thus the "new ground" Aristotle broke must
be seen as nothing more than intrasystematic improvements.
10. In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes, "every virtue causes its possessors to be in a good state
and to perform their functions well." Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Ind ianapolis: Hackett
Publishing, 1985), 1106a16.
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timekeeping, then it ought to keep time well. If the function of human beings is
rationality, then humans ought to live in accordance with, and in right exercise
of, reason.
The second feature of Aristotle's moral philosophy is eudaimonia. A difficult
word to translate - blessedness, happiness, prosperity - it seems to connote
"the state of being well and doing well in being well, of man's being well-favored
himself and in relation to the divine" (148). Eudaimonia names that telos toward
which humans move. Virtues, then a ·
ement toward eudaimonia, but
eudaimonia cannot be e ned apart from these same virtues:
But the exercise of the virtues is not in this sense a means to the end of the good
for man. For what constitutes the good for man is a complete human life lived at
its best, and the exercise of the virtues a necessary and central part of such a life,
not a mere preparatory exercise to secure such a life. We thus cannot characterize
the good for man without already having made reference to the virtues. (149)
The apparent circularity of the relation between teios, eudaimonia, and virtue
is not a mark against Aristotle's system but, rather, an advance over Plato's. For
Plato, "reality" not only denoted the world of rocks and doorknobs, it also included the world of intangibles such as "love" and "17"- things whose existence
in the realm of Form is every bit as real as the middle-sized dry goods that clutter our sensible world. As Plato saw it, "true virtue" belonged to the_realm of
Form, and particular human qualities we~med "virtuous" to the extent that
they resembled the "true virtue" of which they were copies. Thus, there could be
no inherent conflict or disunity between particular virtuous qualities;_!!~
conflict was simply a function of imperfection in copying universal ~tue into
-;;-ticular living. In this way, morality was thought to be objective and moral reasoning an exercise o the intellect according to which the mind grasped the Form
of "true virtue." Ironically, Plato's doctrine failed even to overcome the relativist
claims of the Sophists and tragic dramatists of his own day. Although MacIntyre does not think that Aristotle himself explicitly conquered the problem
of what to do when virtues conflict, his model, which defines teios, eudaimonia,
and virtue in terms of each other, does point the way toward conceiving moral
reasoning as a_..:!!_ill ra~ as an exercise of intellect (as Plato and the later
Enlightenmenttllli1kers ima~<n. Such skilf"coUia be attained and cultivated
only from within the form of life in which these concepts were at home.
The third feature of Aristotle's system is the distinction between theoretical
, _ ...__
reasoning and ractical reasoning. Practical reasonit
~with a ~t, or
go , or esire and always termmates in action. Suppose you are thirsty"after
a long day of shopping. The maJOr premise of your reasoning process is your
(obvious) belief that anyone who is thirsty is well advised to find a drinking
fountain. The minor premise of this line of thought is your knowledge that
a drinking fountain exists in the northwest corner of this particular department
store. Your practical reasoning terminates in your act of walking to the northwest
corner of the store and quenching your thirst.

m
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In. Aristotle's way of looking at things, m5:ral reasoning is an instance of
practical reasoning. It is assisted by virtues of character (which temper, guide,
ana shape initial desires) and virtues of thought (such as phronesis, which enables
the perception of practical reasoning's major premises). 11
Perhaps the most important use of practical reason is its employment in the
balancing of human activities. I cannot spend all my time in theoretical contemplation, the highest faculty of reason and thus the highest human good (158),
because I would soon starve to death. In order to maximize the amount of time
I can engage in contemplation, I must balance this activity with work, civic duty,
and the like. This mental balanc·
·s the domai
· reason. This
e~planation , so s 1eds light on why virtuous persons make the best civic leaders,
smce skill in practical reasoning is also what it takes to run the polis.
The fourth feature of Aristotle's moral philosophy that Macintyre emphasizes is fnendshi£. Friendship, of course, mvolves mutuit affectiOn, but for
Aristotle, "that affection arises within a relationship defined in terms of common
allegiance to and a common pursuit of goods" (156). This is to say that Aristotle's notion on friendship presupposes, first, the existence of the polis, which
re~common good possible, and second that this ood itself is the health
of the polis: "We are to think then of friendship as being ilie sharing of , in
~he common project of creating and sustaining the life of the city, a sharing
mcorporated in the immediacy of an individual's particular friendships" (156).
. The emphasis on friendship in Aristotle illustrates one aspect of continuity
111 this historic tradition, namel , that the moral structure IS mtlmatel linkea

Obstacles to Be Hurdled
Aristotle is definitely the hero of Macintyre's account. And at the time After
Virtue was written (1981, revised 1984) Macintyre saw Aristotle as the apex of
the virtue tradition. 12 However, if Macintyre is to succeed in rejuvenating the
Aristotelian tradition, he must overcome three difficulties in Aristotle's account
that threaten to topple the whole project. First, Aristotle's notion of telos rests
~n his distinctive "metaphysical biology." In Aristotle's view, the form guarantees
that all humans share a common essence. The essence of humanness is rationality. Rationality is of two sorts, theoretical and practical. The telos of human
11. Since right action follows in straightforward fashion from the initial desire and major premise,
and sin ce differences in initial desires as well as differences in major premises boil down to variations
in the exercise of th e respective virtues, moral quandaries arc nonexistent for Aristotle. When in a
bind, he can always defer to the maxim "the morally right action .is that taken by the virtuous
person."

12. In later works, Macintyre becomes convinced that Aquinas had succeeded in surpassing Aristotle on several points. Sec Alasdair Macintyre, Whose justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival
Vemons o/Moral Euquiry: Encyc!opaerlia, Genealogy, and Traditiou (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1990).
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life, then, is actualization of both forms of reason. The goal of ~~o~
son is contem lation; the goal of practical reason is life in the ohs. Ansto~e s
p o em was to give an account o how pursmt o these two forms of ratiOnality could be reconciled. Macintyre's problem is to provide a replacement .for
Aristotle's concept of form that will enlighten us as to the telos of human hfe.
Traditions provide answers to this question. Second, the virtue t · ·
sees
morality as inextricably enmeshed in the life of the...iQ'lis.
hat does this .do
fur tfie<applicibiT1ty of the Aristote~el today, in view of the exti~ctton
of the polis? Third, Aristotle retains Plato's belief in the unity o
Virtue~
which implies that every putative c
age y reduces to an instance tha~ ~s
"simply the result of flaws of character in individuals or of unintelligent political arrangements" (157). As Sophocles dramatized, instances of tragic evil were
not inconceivable. Can such real conflicts be interpreted as contributing to the
moral life rather than confusing it?
In addition to the three problems internal to Aristotle's account, Macintyre
notes one problem external to it. To identify the trajectory from Homer to Aristotle to Aquinas to the present as a single tradition, something must be done to
reconcile the diversity in the lists of virtues taken from every age. l~Y have
th~hanged w"ITh each scrc'Cessive formuiahon of the tradition,13 but how
virtue is defined at one point in history is at odds with the definition explicated
14
in another age. Thus, the fourth problem Macintyre must overcome is. the
challenge of demonstrating the kind of continuity between these formulatiOns
that makes these disparate accounts a single, unified tradition.
We now turn to Macintyre's own "metanarrative" to see if he is successful
in his endeavors.

Ethics

a Ia Macintyre

The disparity between virtue lists and even between the definitions of the term
can be reconciled, .says Macintyre, by bringing to light the particular backdrop
that each formulatiOn pre.supposes. '!'he tricky part of his analysis is that each of
the central concepts- vzrtue, practzce, narrative, and tradition_ can lz$_ defined
onlyJnally, in ter~ the sth.e.!:_ concepts. This does not make the MacintYrean v~rsio_n guilt~ of ci~cu.lari1 y. It simply means that getting a handle on ?is
explanat10n iS not like buildmg a house (which progresses incrementally, bnck
by bri~~) but like watching the sun rise - the light dawns gradually over the
whole.

I

l

13. E.g., the early church fathers champion humility as a virtue while Aristotle repudiates it as a
vice (182)!
'
. B . . F nklin sees virtues
14. E .g., Aristotle sees virtues as the means to internal end
1
111
as means to external, even utilitarian, ends (184) .
s, w e CnJUmll1 ra
15. This illustration comes from Ludwig Wittgenstcin 0 C
.
d G E M Anscombe
·
D · p 1
>
n ertamty, c . . . ·
and G · H . von Wnght, trans. ems au and G. E . M · An scam b c (N ew v ork: H arp cr Torchbooks '
1
1969, 1972), §141.
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Practices
The_corncrsto~ of this backdrop is the idea of 2ractices . .Macintyre defines a
practice somewhat tortuously as
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course
of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are
systematically extended. (187)

Attention to the grammar of this sentence reveals four central concepts. First,
practices are human activities. However, these are not activities of isolated indi~ but socially established and cooperative activities. Such activities cannot
be executed alonebUt require participation by like-minded others. In addition
to being social, these activities are also complex enough to be challenging, and
coherent enough to aim at some ~oal in a unified fashion. Building a house is
a practice, while takfng long showers is not. The game of tennis is a practice,
?ut hitting a backhand is not. Medicine is a practice, while gargling mouthwash
1s not. 16
Second, practices have goods that are internal to the activit . Some practices,
for examp e, JUnspru ence, ave extern goods- money, fame, power- which
come as by-products of the practice. But true practices are marked by internal
goods - those rewards that can be recognized and appreciated only by particr:pant0'7 For example, I can bribe my son with pieces of candy to learn the game
of chess. But at some point he may begin to enjoy the game of chess for itself.
At t?is point he has become a practitioner and member of the greater community of chess players. He has, furthermore, become hooked on its internal
reward- the joy of chess- something to which all players have access.
T1:ird, practices have standards of excellence without which internal goods
c~nnot oe fully ach1eved. The joy of chess is in having played well. And what
c?~nts for excellence has been determined by the historical community of practltlOners. The practitioners have recognized that stalemate is not as desirable an
endgame as checkmate. And to execute a queen-rook fork is more satisfying
than simple en passant.
Fourth, practices are systematically extendes;l As practitioners have striven
for excellence day in and day out over the years, the standards of the practice,
along with practitioners' abilities to achieve these standards, have slowly risen.
Perhaps no field better illustrates this than medicine. Doctors were no doubt
sincere when they once treated fevers with leeches, but contemporary physicians
possess skills that far surpass those of their predecessors. Yet the dependence
of contemporary practitioners upon their predecessors is unquestionable: it is

~~-

For an extended discussion of practices see Chapter 7 in this volume.
..
· lt •s often, but not always, the case that mtcrnal rewards are shared among all practitiOners
It 110Ut d•mmution.
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precisely because previous doctors strove for excellence that the specific ~dvanc~s
in medicine that have been made have been made. But increase in techmcal skill
does not quite capture what is meant by the notion of systematic extension. It
also includes the way technically proficient doctors have come to appreciate how
the health of a patient is a function of a larger system. Thus, the p~acti~e of
medicine is slowly being extended to encompass care for the whole patient 10 all
his or her psychosocial complexity. 18
Against the backdrop of practices, virtue can be defined as "an acquired
human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve
those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively
prevents us from achieving any such goods" (191). The clan leader who practices
warcraft and the church father who practices evangelism are assisted by the qualities of courage and humility respectively. Against this backdrop ma~y of the
discrepancies between virtue lists can be reconciled as a matter of d1fferences
of practice.
In our smorgasbord era it is tempting to think of practices as self-contained
exercises. In fact, many practices are so complex that they have become an ~n
tire tradition in themselves. Medicine, science, and warcraft all have attendmg
epistemologies, authoritative texts, structured communities and institutions, and
histori~s of _developmen_t .. Other practices are parts of clusters that contr~bute
to the 1denttty of a trad1t10n. For example, the Christian tradition defin_es 1tself
as a socially e~p~n~ing movement called "the kingdom of God." At 1ts co~e,
therefo_re, Chnst1am~y seems to consist primarily of the practice of commumty
for~atwn. Subpract1ce~ that contribute to community formation can be categonzed
under
the rubncs of witness' worsh 1;T'
and
11 works o,+mercy, discernment,
. .
. 19
.
.
1
dzsczpleshzp. Other schemes can be imagined of course but my pomt 1s that
Christianity cannot be explained or understood without r~ference to a distinctive
cluster of practices. I:1 order to participate in the tradition called Christianity one_~ust ~ecessanly participate in these practices. To put it another way,
to p~rt1~1pate m _the com~unity is to participate in practices because c~mmu
nal hfe 1s the p01~t at wh1ch the practices intersect. Furthermore, knowmg the
constitutiv~ pract1~es of Christi~nity tells us a great deal about how Christi~ns
ought to. live. If v1rtues are cultiVated by stnvmg
· · 10r
r
excelle nee in the pract1ce
. .
of practices,
then
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are
unable
to
grow
·n
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.
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Narrative
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a~proaches you at a bus stop and says "The name of the common wild duck is
hzstrionicus histrionicus histrionicus." Now, what would you make of this person?

Truth is, you can't make anything of her, or of her action, without more information. Her act is completely unintelligible. But now suppose it becomes known
that this woman is a librarian, and she has mistaken you for the person who
earlier had asked for the Latin name of the common wild duck. We can now
understand her action because it has been put into a context. The contexts that
~out of human action are stories or narratives. To explain an action is
strnply to provide the story that gives the act its context. We can imagine any
number of stories that might make sense out of the bus stop incident (for ex~rnple, perhaps she is a Russian spy whose password is the sentence in question).
Ut We will also say that the explanation of her action is rendered more fully if
we can tell the story that takes her longer- and longest-term intentions into ac~ount and shows how her shorter-term intentions relate to the longer-term ones.
ulo We rnight discover that she has rushed out of the library in search of a partic/r patron because she has been put on a standard of performance under threat
? losing her job. Her longer-term intention is to save her job. Her longest-term
~ntention might be uncovered in telling the story of how she is the sole provider
or her paraplegic son. Macintyre reasons that if human actions are intelligible
~nly With respect to stories that contextualize intentions, then that which unies actions into sequences and sequences into a continuous whole is the story of
One' l'c
s .he. 1Jy life as a whole makes sense when my stor.l:' is told.
b' 1'hts has important consequences for the problem of Aristotle's "metaphysical
t~ology." Imagine we had the opportunity to ask Aristotle "How can I know
"1'~ I arn the same person as the me of ten years ago?" He would likely reply,
i
ough your body changes through growth and decay, your form, or essence, is
Immutable." But this answer is not likely to fly very far for a modern audience.
t~econ:rast, Macintyre suggests that narrative ,rro.vides a bett~r explanation for
s· Untty of a human life. The self has contmUJty because 1t has played th.elitngle and central character in a particular stor - the narrative of a erson'
n.~
·
JS way: t e umty of the self "resides in the unity of a
t arrative which links birth to life to death as a narrative beginning to middle
o end" (205).
tivJUst as practices have a characteristically social dimension, so also do narraP es. Humorist Garrison Keillor reminisces about the distinctive characters who
i:~ulated the Lake Wobegon, Minnesota, of his childhood. But notice how
rn ~entifying themselves as "Norwegian bachelor farmers" such folk have im0 e tately linked who they are with others who share these ethnic, gender, and
e~Upational features. I cannot explain who I am without utilizing some soPr placernarkers which identify me with certain strata of my community. If
goe~ed to go beyond this first-level answer to "Who am I?" where can one
fri Ut to say that I am also someone's neighbor, child, sibling, student, mate,
eo end, constituent, or employee? In occupying these roles we simultaneously beme subplots in the stories of others' lives just as they have become subplots in
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ours. In this way, the life stories of members of a community are enmeshed and
intertwined. This entanglement of our stories is the fabric of communal life:
"For the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities
from which I derive my identity" (221). Our stories are concretely embedded,
or our stories intersect, in those practices in which we are co-participants. For
example, the role of ethics professor links the instructor with the rest of the faculty in general and one group of students in particular, within the wider practice
of graduate education.
This construction overcomes the fear that the Aristotelian account of the
virtues cannot be sustained after the extinction of the volis. In Macintyre's constructi~n, virtues are those qualities that assist one in tlle extension of his or her
story, and, by extrapolation, the extension of the story of his or her corniTl.\!!1ity
or communit~. The questio~-nvviiat ought 1 to do?" is not a qil""estion of one's
\political duty as it was in Aristotle's day, but it is a question whose answer must
be preceded by the logically prior question: "Of which stories am I a part?"
Although none of us will ever have the clear moral parameters that were to be
had in the well-defined social framework of Aristotle's polis, the concept of narrative embeddedness still explains the presence of natural boundaries and moral
momentum. In 1994 a U.S. postal worker lost his job and retaliated by going
on a killing spree. Our responses to his actions were telling. People reacted by
saying he "flipped out," "snapped," "went berserk," or "had gone insane." Our expectation is that postal workers (even unemployed ones) aren't killers, and once
a postal worker type, always a postal worker type. 20 This illustrates our deeper
belief that rational human behavior is actio
t sta s within the bou~ies
of "character." To step outside these oundaries is not merely to act irrationally
but to lose one's sanity. This is because the narrative shape of human life carries
with it a certain degree of moral momentum. For example, my wife can bank
on the fact that I won't wake up tomorrow morning and say "Today I think I'll
become an ax murderer!" There is a certain momentum in who I am; I will generally stay "in character." The transition from who I was yesterday to who I am
today will be a smooth one, marked only by minor changes. A drastic change in
character- whether for the better or for the worse- is always taken to be the
result of a long-term, preexistent (though perhaps not publicly visible) process.

Tradition
The third term that forms the backdrop to all the various accounts of virtue is
the notion of tmdition. Macintyre defines tradition as "an historically extended,
socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods
which constitute the tradition" (222). This definition has three components.
First, Macintyre's understanding of tradition is really the lo ic ex~on of
~eatment of narrative:....To be "historically exten
" · &-S~y ex20. We would even say that someone who sincerely harbors paran oia that the mail carrier is a
killer is mentally maladjusted.
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ten~. Just as the self has the unity of playing a single character in a lifelong
story, go too the community has its own continui.!Y_- despite loss and gain of
members - because the community itself is a character of sorts in a narrative
that is longer than the span of a single human life. For example, Christians in
the Reformed tradition feel kinship with John Calvin because they can tell the
story (recount the history) of the Reformed Church from Calvin's Geneva to
their present church community.
Second a tradition is "socially embodied" because traditions are lived in community. A tradition has its inception 111 t e ormatwn of the community t at
Is-deiii1ed by those who have pledged corporate allegiance to the tradition's authoritative voice or text.21 In that this prophetic word shapes the practices of
communal life, the community is said to "embody" the tradition's persona in
that age. For example, early Christians prayed because their scriptures exemplify,
illustrate, and command the practice of prayer. Outsiders, who have no access
to the authoritative text, can still read the nature of the Christian tradition off
the lives and practices of the community's members. Should the community die
off or disband, the tradition passes out of existence (at least until another group
rallies in the same way around the same text). In this way the tradition has the
quality of being "socially embodied." However, because the application of the
authoritative text or voice is done afresh in every successive generation, the tradition remains a live option only so long as the discussion about the text's relevance
and meaning is sustained. Hence, third. traditions are necessarily lon~ standing
arg_uments. But let's get clearer on the notion of historical extension because thiSwill help us evaluate the current status of the virtue tradition.
Just as selves and communities are characters in their respective stories, so
too traditions are also characters in an even wider narrative. When we recount
Christian, Jewish, or Muslim history, we are telling the story of just such a
character. The viability of any one tradition is not merely its historical survival, however, but its historical extension. Macintyre uses this term to describe
the growth a tradition undergoes through time as it overcomes obstacles raised
against it. In his sequel to After Virtue called Whose justice? Which Rationality?
he defines a tradition as
an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental agreements
are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict: those with critics
and enemies external to the tradition ... and those internal, interpretive debates
through which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements come to
be expressed and by whose progress a tradition is constituted. 22

For example, early Christians faced a crisis when they tried to reconcile three
seemingly inconsistent beliefs: God is one, Jesus is divine, and Jesus is not the
Father. The well-known "solution" to this quandary came when the Cappadocian
21. For an extended account of how traditions are born and develop see chap. 18 of Macintyre's
Whose justice? Which Rationality?
22. Whose justice? Which Rationality? 12.
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fathers borrowed Platonic resources to frame the doctrine of the Trinity. This
enabled Christians to believe all three propositions without logical contradiction.
The universal adoption of their formulation as orthodoxy at Constantinople (381
A.D.) freed the Christian tradition to move on to tackle the next obstacle in its
path. 23 We don't know how long the trinitarian problem might have been sustained had the Cappadocian fathers not entered the debate. We do know that
by 325 A .D. the stakes were very high - unacceptable proposals were deemed
heretical, and their authors were banished from the community (or worse). Were
it not for belief in God's sovereignty over history, it would be tempting to wonder how long Christianity might have lasted had not the trinitarian problem
been overcome.
If virtue theor is itself a tradition in the sense ·ust described then we can see
~ .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~=
that its v1a ilit de ends u on overcoming the obstac es that threaten !he Aristo!e 1an version. We have already seen ow narratzve overcomes the problem of
Aristotle's metaphysical biology and how practices overcome the problem of discrepancies in the virtue lists. The extinction of the polis is a third crisis that must
be overcome. For Aristotle, the telos of life, together with the attending virtues,
can be expressed only in terms of life in the polis. One reason the virtuous person
was identical to the virtuous citizen was that without the prosperity and leisure
engendered by the shared life of the city-state, the highest telos (for Aristotle,
metaphysical contemplation) was an impractical and impossible ideal. But by exercise of practical reason the polis flourished in such a way that contemplation
could be maximized (at least by the elite). However, a more fundamental reason
virtue was tied to the polis was that the Good, at which human life aims, was
thought to be a cor orate ood that could not be possessed b isolated individuals but on ·a·
·
munit . The polis wast e by-product of pursuing this
corporate Good together. To put it differently, the Good was this corporate life.
But now the polis is no more. Therefore, in order for the virtue tradition to be
extended, there must be an alternative way to understand the social dimension of
virtue. Of course, this is ground we have already covered. The narrative shape
of human existence - that is, that human sociality is identical to the embeddedness of our respective narratives- shows the way to preserve the sociality of
virtue theory even in the absence of the polis.
Narrative extends the Aristotelian tradition in another way as well. Macintyre
credits the high medieval age with conceptualizing the genre of our narrativity
to be akin to the quest for the Holy Grail: "In the high medieval scheme a
central genre is the tale of a quest or journey. Man is essentially in via. The end
which he seeks is something which if gained can redeem all that was wrong with
his life up to that point" (174-75). Macintyre goes on to say that this move was
un-Aristotelian in at least two ways. First, it
telos of life be
·
in contrast to Aristotle, who imagined the telos of life to be "a certain kind of
23. The next major debate was the doctrine of Christ: if Christ was God the Son, how arc we to
understand the relation of his divine and human natures while preserving the unity of his person?
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life." Second, it allowed for the possibility of positive evil in contrast to the Aristotelian scheme, which understood evil as always the privation of good. These
two features gave the medieval view an advantage over Aristotle in dealing with
the problem of tragic evil. In the eyes of the medieval person, the achievement
of the human te!os counterbalanced all evil, even evils of the tragic sort envisioned by Sophocles. Thus, the fourth objection that threatened Aristotle (that
is, tragic evil) has been overcome by the Aristotelian tradition:
The narrative therefore in which human life is embodied has a form in which the
subject ... is set a task in the completion of which lies their peculiar appropriation of the human good; the way toward which the completion of that task is
barred by a variety of inward and outward evils. The virtues are those qualities
which enable evils to be overcome, the task to be accomplished, the journey to be
completed. (175)

~aclntyre concludes, therefore, that tragic choices are real but that the inevitability of such choice does not render morality unintelligible or criterionless
(as the emotivist claims, thereby concluding that moral choices boil down to
matters of preference). Rather such choice lays a central role in the dev lo ment of character b
roviding an occasion for mor agents to exercise and
b~d virtue when they sustain t e ques or goo precisefy at the tim<:_l!_is most
costly to
"the good life for man lS the Ide spent in seel<ing for the
good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will
enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for man is," then
tragic evil is overcome because evil, even evil of the tragic sort, cannot diminish
this kind of good (219). Instead of detrac~ from this kind of goodness tragic
~even be thought to contribute to the monil hber of the life so lived. his
solution to the problem of tragic evil mploysaview of life that has come out of
a particular historical cross-section of the tradition. Because the medieval period
provides them with the resources for overcoming this obstacle, adherents to this
tradition are warranted in retaining this feature from their corporate past. So
then, not only are practices and narratives sources for understanding the human
tefos, but tradition itself contributes to this understanding.
Identifying the genre of a tradition's narrative also makes sense out of the
fractal symmetry that can be seen when we look at the way in which the narrative unity of (1) a life, (2) a commu · and (3) a tradition , r
utuall nested.
Individual, com~unity, an tradition, while te mg 1 ferent parts of the master
story, nevertheless share equally in the genre of that story. Thus, if the genre of
the tradition is that of a quest, the genre of a human life is also that of a quest.
And if human life is a quest, then human virtues are those qualities that assist it:

ao=so::n

The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not
only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but
which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by enabling
us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing
knowledge of the good. (219)
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Retrospect
Looking back, we can see not only that the virtue tradition that Macintyre has
recounted fits Macintyre's definition of tradition but that it is one in which
Macintyre represents the most recent advance! He has succeeded in overcoming
four important obstacles to the Aristotelian model by elucidating the story about
stories, or what has been called the metanarrative about the narrative quality
of human life. In so doing he has clarified how the notions of telos, virtue,
practice, narrative, and tradition form a mutually supporting and interlocking
web of concepts.
Let us recall now the master argument of After Virtue. Macintyre Q:all~
~s to reconsider the e~conclusion (namely, that morality is by nature
·ght nmeQ!_
nothing more than matters of preference) by ar uin that the
Project's move
e udiate all thin s social t at is, virtues and practices) and
mgs historical (that ts, narrative an tradition) was a major misstep. He
argued further that moral imperatives can be derived from an answer to the
question "What is human life for?" In the same way the functional definition
of a watch ("A watch is for timekeeping") entails its virtue (accuracy), its functional imperative ("A watch ought to keep time well"), and its ground for being
evaluated ("This grossly inaccurate watch is a bad watch"). To have a grasp on
the human telos affords us with moral virtues, moral imperatives, and sufficient
grounds for moral judgment. Furthermore, because narratives intersect at social
practices, and practices constitute traditions, and traditions are historically (that
is, narratively) extended, to understand virtue adequately as those qualities that
assist pursuit of telos at all three levels, virtue itself must be given a threefold
definition:
The virtues find their point and purpose not only in sustaining those relationships necessary if the variety of goods internal to practices are to be achieved and
not only in sustaining the form of an individual life in which that individual may
seek out his or her good as the good of his or her whole life, but also in sustaining those traditions which provide the practices and individual lives with their
necessary historical context. (223)
This relationship might be diagrammed as in Figure 3.
Aristotle's notion of ~IJ!e as "e~ellency of funct~ has thus_ b~en expanded. Human virtues are learned qualities that assist us in achtevmg the
human telos, which can be understood by considering (1) the functional definition of the human person, which is provided by the master story of the
tradition, (2) the internal goods of those practices that constitute the tradition,
and (3) those roles that arise at the intersection of our life stories. To put it differently, moral imperatives arise from that understanding of the human te!os that
arises within the context of those practices, narratives, and tradition in which
we locate ourselves.
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Conclusion
In the end there is much unfinished business. Macintyre himself bemoans the
marked absence of moral communities in the modern world. But this is not the
only problem that must be addressed in the wake of After Virtue. For example,
if the answer to "What is human life for?" is supplied to each of us by our
respective practices, narratives, and traditions, doesn't this still leave us with an
incurable problem of m...Qral pluralism if not one of downright relativism? Are
there some criteria for adjudicating multiple traditions? Further, if Macintyre's
project succeeds, are we in the Western world not faced with the dilemma of
being inheritors of at least two conflicting traditions
lllely, Aristotelianism
and political liberalism)? r can
ac ntyre's thesis possibly succeed if, in fact,
the Aristotelian tradition died with the Enlightenment? With what resources
can it be exhumed and resuscitated?
Macintyre is not unaware of these perplexities. Some of the objections
earned responses in the second edition of After Virtue while others he has made
the central concern of later books. But the mere presence of these objections
does not count against his system because they become the fodder for enlivening the debate by which the tradition is extended. The question "Is Macintyre's
moral philosophy the final word?" is wrongheaded. The better question is "Is it
the best one so far?"

